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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930279-CA 
v. : 
MATTHEW WRIGHT, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury 
of forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Only one issue is presented on appeal: When an 
eyewitness to a crime provides the offender's name, would 
subsequently showing a photograph of defendant to the witness to 
confirm that he is the person named be so impermissibly 
suggestive as to require reversal? 
This Court need not reach the merits of this issue 
because defendant made no objection below and argues neither 
plain error nor exceptional circumstances on appeal. State v. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Baglev, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). 
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's 
claim, it should "review the record evidence and determine from 
the totality of the circumstances whether the admission of the 
identification is consistent with . . . [constitutional] 
guarantees [.]" State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 & n.3 (Utah 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in the addendum of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with forgery, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 8) . 
Addendum A. A jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the 
court sentenced him to a term not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State Prison, together with a fine (R. 116, 119). The court 
stayed the sentence and placed defendant on probation for 
eighteen months. It also granted defendant's motion to enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense 
conditioned on his successful completion of probation (R. 119). 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, challenging 
his conviction (R. 121-22). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant moved into Robert L. Schmidt's apartment soon 
after he began working for Smith's Food King in early 1992 (Trial 
Transcript [hereinafter "Tr."] 206-07, 282-83). He and Schmidt 
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shared the apartment until the end of the following August, when 
defendant moved out so that Schmidt's girlfriend could move in 
(Tr. 207, 209, 216, 284-85). In mid-August, Schmidt noticed that 
check number 225 was missing from his checkbook (Tr. 208-09). 
When he told defendant about the check, defendant claimed he did 
not know anything about it (Tr. 209) . 
In late July or early August, while defendant was 
working a shift at the Smith's store in Kearns, Utah, Schmidt 
introduced him to Brett Huff, another Smith's employee working 
the same shift (Tr. 206, 240-41). Defendant and Huff worked the 
eight-hour shift together, spending twenty minutes working on the 
same project, and seeing each other throughout the remainder of 
the shift (Tr. 226-27, 242). Huff saw defendant periodically 
thereafter when one would be ending a shift and the other 
beginning one (Tr. 227) . 
On September 15, 1992, defendant entered the Smith's 
store at 2135 South 900 East and approached Huff who was working 
as a checker (Tr. 224-25, 227-29, 242). Huff recognized 
defendant when defendant approached him but was not sure whether 
defendant would recognize him (Tr. 230, 238-39, 244, 249-50). 
Defendant handed Huff a check made out to Smith's that appeared 
to have been signed by Robert Schmidt and asked Huff if he would 
cash it (Tr. 229-30). Because Huff suspected that something was 
wrong, he asked defendant for identification, following store 
policy which requires that a cashier take the identification from 
a person they suspect of trying to cash someone else's check so 
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the person cannot go to another store and cash more checks (Tr. 
229-30, 240). When defendant failed to produce any 
identification, Huff took the check to the store manager, again 
pursuant to store policy (Tr. 230). 
Huff told the manager that he believed the check "was 
bogus" and suggested that they call Schmidt, which they did (Tr. 
231-32). Huff told Schmidt that his roommate was trying to cash 
Schmidt's check, to which Schmidt responded that he did not write 
the check, did not want it cashed, and wanted Huff to tear it up 
(Tr. 210, 232). Huff tore up the check, put the pieces in an 
envelope, and returned to his checkstand to find that defendant 
had left (Tr. 233). 
Huff had nothing more to do with the matter until he 
was contacted the following week by Officer Tom Olsen of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department (Tr. 233-34, 263-65) . Olsen had 
received the check from the initial investigating officer and had 
pieced the check back together (Tr. 255-56, 264). Huff 
positively identified defendant by name as the person who gave 
him the check (Tr. 234, 265). Because Olsen knew that more tfcan 
one Matthew Wright lived in the area, he showed Huff a picture of 
defendant to be sure they were talking about the same person (Tr. 
264, 269-70). Thereafter, at trial, Huff testified that he was 
100 percent sure that defendant was the person who gave him the 
check on September 15th (Tr. 247). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should decline • reacr. - ne merits of 
defendant' s clain i c f ai 1 improper phc;_. - a- . ri cat ion process 
because defendant made no objection below and fails to argue 
either plain error - r exceptional circumstances . • -.rreai. 
Should *_:.-. L reach i.he merits ni ;.:^, .s.ue, it wil 1 
find that, under the facts of c m s case, t>> re is nc reasonable 
likelihood of irreparak :.e mis id- ::: : : : rat: - - - ^ s - * . r - * :Iuf f ' s 
review of defendant, s photograph. I.si .: • s m c ^ e pn^tograph 
:c c:nfirT whir:, person Huff had named had .: detrimental impact 
pre incto identif .:a:^r. w.Jfc- identica^ _ . ?—^' P-< * 
identification, he positively recognized defendant -.* \ne rime of 
tl i€ c -f f ense, and i le j: i : c • ;r:i d e ::i cie* ~-Y —~ 
before seeing the picture, 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF AN IMPROPER PHOTO 
IDENTIFICATION PROCESS BECAUSE NO OBJECTION 
WAS MADE BELOW, AND DEFENDANT ASSERTS NEITHER 
PLAIN ERROR NOR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON 
APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
FAILS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE 
LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE MISIDENTIFICATION 
AT TRIAL RESULTING FROM THE WITNESS' PRE-
TRIAL VIEWING OF DEFENDANT'S PHOTOGRAPH 
Defendant challenges the use of one photograph as being 
unnecessarily suggestive and improper because it di d not give the 
witness, tiiett Hull, .JIIJ opportunity I u *. ": " : defendant tc 
William Clark, whom defendant identifies h- a remaining 
suspect [ ] '" ex. of Arr ai 7. He contends that the photograph 
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served to ingrain defendant's likeness into Huff's memory, 
thereby reducing the trustworthiness of Huff's subsequent 
identification of defendant. Br. of App. at 6.1 
Defendant has failed to preserve this issue for 
appellate review. Defense counsel made no objection when the 
subject of the identification procedure was raised at trial or 
when Huff made his in-court identification of defendant (Tr. 228-
29, 264-66) . Addendum B. Further, he makes no effort on appeal 
to establish either plain error or exceptional circumstances to 
excuse the lack of an objection below. Consequently, this Court 
need not reach the merits of defendant's claim. State v. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Baqlev, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
Even on the merits, defendant's argument is 
unpersuasive under the facts of this case. While a danger exists 
that an out-of-court one-photograph identification procedure may 
heighten the chance of misidentification because the witness is 
"'apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather 
than of the person actually seen,'" State v Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 
651 (Utah 1989) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
383-84 (1968)), not every such procedure constitutes error. See 
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 651-52. The facts of each case and the 
totality of the circumstances must be considered before the 
1
 Defendant does not challenge the cautionary identification 
instruction given the jury (R. 102-04). 
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procedure may be determined : - t *=> ^  impermissibly suggestive as 
t' :: wan ai it i ever sal See Bruct 2d a 1: 65 3 52 ; see also 
State v. Ramirez, 81 7 P. 2d 7~4 781-cl & n 3 (Utah 1.391). 
In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court found that a witness' 
viewing uf a single pho'tcg: -.-AI.1: oidt'i L<. I Leu "in oil iii.-im 
face with which the witness «ai-' already familiar did not 
constitute an impermissibly- ruggestive identificatitn procedure 
as :I t did not give i ise ,. . reasonaD.-j -.-.e^inc^- ...' 
irreparable misidentificaticn at trial - • 2d at 652. The 
single photograph used in L I U S case ±s even less likely to he' -f 
resulted j n irreparable misidentif icat ion than t:*-. pnoto used . 
Bruce because the witness r> : e \i;ev, r : * * r;e face and the name cf 
11: i e c f f e n d e i: j: • r :il c i t : -• " * * -.: r. '- z f d :i :i n o t 
view the photograph tc iaenL-iy someont n^ ..ad see:: only during 
the offense and diz :::: otherwise recognize Instead., he viewed 
confirm :^i tne officer that they were discussing : ;;e same person 




off i cer deeme d :i t i lecessai: y because 1 le I ::i ie ; ; ..e 
Matthew Wright in the area (Tr. 270) Huff recognized 
defendant's name and his relationship • Schmidt long before 
jjhuLograph ( li : 2 
confident post-photograph identification c: defendant did not 
^arv *rom his positi ve pre-photograph identification (compare Tr. 
<!bLj, 2 ; 2 wit I l T11 ) . 
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Moreover, despite defendant's summary assertion that 
Clark was a "suspect" and was "in [a] position to have stolen and 
cashed the check [,]" Br. of App. at 5, 7, there is no record 
evidence that William Clark was ever considered to be a suspect. 
Nothing puts him in Schmidt's apartment near the time the check 
disappeared, and nothing suggests his whereabouts the night of 
September 15, 1992. The record indicates only that Clark looked 
similar to defendant and visited Schmidt's apartment "a few 
times" (Tr. 214-15, 218-19). 
Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, 
there is no reasonable likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification resulting from Huff's review of defendant's 
photograph. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / j ^day of October, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
LIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-6-501 CRIMINAL CODE 
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to 
give his opinion as to the value of such prop-
erty. State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 
1982). 
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar 
with the value of his possessions, an owner is 
competent to testify on the present market 
value of his property. State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 
243 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987); State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J U T . 2d. — 50 Am. Jur . 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny f 60(1). 
§ 44. Key Numbers . — Larceny «» 23. 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1)A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property. or(a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. ) 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
not. State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 
1981). 
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least 
$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v. 
Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985). 
To prove market value in a different city, the 
cities must be sufficiently close geographically 
and similar in population to be considered com-
parable for purposes of valuing the property. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
—Testimony of owner . 
Owner is competent to testify to the value of 
stolen property where the owner's opinion of 
the value is based on comparable prices for 
similar property. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1978). 
182 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-501 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enac ted by L. 
1973, cb . 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, S 19; 
1975, cb . 62, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Attempted forgery. 
Attempt to utter. 
Attorney signing client's name. 




Elements of offense. 







False pretenses distinguished. 
Fictitious name. 
Indictment or information. 
Intent. 




—Authority to sign another's name. 





The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Attempt to ut ter . 
Where information charging offense of forg-
ery contained one count for forgery and an-
other for uttering, attempt to utter could be 
shown, for it was immaterial that attempt to 
utter was unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering 
or attempting to utter that was of evidentiary 
value. State v. Green, 89 Utah 437,57 P.2d 750 
(1936). 
Attorney signing client 's n a m e . 
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attor-
ney to execute documents in the name of a cli-
ent, does not authorize an attorney to forge a 
client's name to a negotiable instrument such 
as a settlement check and does not preclude 
the attorney's conviction for forgery as a mat-
ter of law when he does so; however, when an 
attorney acts pursuant to the general author-
ity granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be 
Cross-Reference*. — Checks, burden of 
proof as to sending by telegraph, § 69-1-3. 
Expert testimony, Rule 15, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667 
P 2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplice's 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, de-
fendant committed forgery as defined under 
Subsection (1Kb), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authorized defendant to sign his 




Insanity, if sufficiently established, would 
constitute defense to a charge of forgery. State 
v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 545 (1909). 
-—Postdated check. 
In prosecution for forgery, fact that forged 
check was postdated did not help defendant, 
who had attempted to pass it. State v. Green, 
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936). 
Elements of offense. 
—Making and passing. 
Crime of forgery could consist of making of 
forged instrument or of passing of instrument 
known to be false, or of both making and pass-
ing such instrument. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 
274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 
Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943). 
—Passing. 
Even though proof failed to show that defen-
dant had personally forged instrument, show-
ing that defendant passed instrument knowing 
it to be false or forged would prove crime of 
forgery. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 
656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 
P 2d 949 (1943). 
—Signature. 
To convict one of uttering and passing forged 
draft, it was not essential that he should have 
personally affixed forged name to draft. State 
v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); 
State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 
(1943). 
Evidence . 
—Handwri t ing . 
In prosecution for issuing two fictitious 
checks, defendant's demand that prosecution 




MS. BYRNE: If I may approach, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BYRNE: Thank you. 
Q Showing you what's been marked State's Exhibit 1 
for identification. Would you take a moment and look at 
that? 
A Okay• 
Q Have you seen that before? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And when did you first see it? 
A Approximately 10:30 that night, on September 15th, 
at the store on 2135 South 900 East. I was working as a 
checker. Matthew Wright came into the store. He asked 
for — 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, may I ask that we proceed 
by question and answer rather than in a narrative form. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Go ahead. 
Q All right. When you speak of Matthew Wright 
coming into the store, is that the person in the courtroom 
today? 
A Yes, he is. 
Q Would you point him out for the Court, please. 
A Be is sitting right here with the Levi jacket. 
MS. BYRNE: May the record reflect identification 
0C228 
96 
of the < 
Q 
defendant? 
THE COURT: Yes, it may. 
MS. BYRNE: Thank you. 
All right. Matthew Wright, the defendant, then 





came into the store? 
Yes, I did. 
And what was the nature of the conversation? 
He approached me and handed me this check and 
asked me to cash it. 
Q And did you make any response to his request that 




I did. I asked him for some ID, which he didn't 
he didn't give it to me. 
Did he make any response to your request for 










He said -- he mumbled something about he had been 
Dff, and he mumbled something else. I wasn't sure 
said. But he didn't produce any ID. 
And did you take a good look at the check at the 
I did. 





Q How long have you been doing that? 
A Two years. 
Q Were you assigned to investigate what may have 
been a forged check at Smith's Food King tendered for cash on 
September 15th of '92? 
A Yes. 
Q And what activities did you engage in in 
investigating this crime? 
A I received the check in our evidence room. It was 
torn in pieces. I put it back together. I contacted the 
individual, the complainant who had made the report. I 
interviewed him. I asked him if he could identify the 
individual. He said that he could. 
Q Excuse me. Who are you referring to as the 
complainant? 
A I believe his name is Brett Huff. I don't have my 
notes in front of me, but I believe that was his name. 
Q You talked to Mr. Huff? 
A That's right. 
Q What else did you do? 
A Showed him a photo to make sure we were talking 
about the same individual. He said, That's the one. That 
was it. Then I screened the case. 




A It was probably a week or so after the case. I 
made some notes on him, but I left them in that chair over 
there if you need exact dates. 
Q At the time you interviewed him, did there seem to 
be any doubt in Mr. Huff's mind as to the identification of 
the individual who passed the check? 
MS. NELLS: Objection. It's leading. 
THE COURT: All right. Sustained. 
Q Do you have any sense of how sure Mr. Huff was of 
his identification of Matthew Wright? 
MS. WELLS: Objection. 
THE COURT: What grounds? 
MS. WELLS: She is asking for him to speculate. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
A Mr. Buff seemed entirely certain of himself, 
saying that he worked with this individual and knew him on 
sight. 
Q In front of you on the desk there is what's been 
marked State's Exhibit 1, a check. Are you familiar with 
that? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that the way if looked after you put it 
together? 
A Yes. 




A That's right. 
Q Where did you get that picture? 
A It's a driver's license photo. 
Q I show you what's been marked as — excuse me. 
Showing you what's been marked as State's Exhibit 
2 for identification. Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you recognize it? 
A It has my name on the bottom from when I ordered 
it from the Driver's License Division. 
Q And is that what you showed to Mr. Huff? 
A It is. 
MS. BYRNE: The State would move to have admitted 
into evidence what's been marked as State's Exhibit 2 for 
identification• 
MS. WELLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 2 is received. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 2 was 
admitted into evidence.) 
Q And what else did you do in terms of the 
investigation of this incident, if you recall? 
A I believe that's it. 
MS. BYRNE: I have no further questions of this 
witness at this time. 
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A That's correct. 
Q Prom this particular case, that check was never 
submitted to Mr. Throckmorton or to any other expert for 
analysis, was it? 
A No. 
Q All right. And you have indicated today that you 
showed — or you had a driver's license of Mr. Wright. Isn't 
that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q So purportedly, assuming that was his handwriting, 
you had an opportunity to ~ you had a sample of Mr. Wright's 
handwriting to compare or have compared against the 
handwriting on the check. Isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. So we do not know whether or not an 
expert in that area could have reached either the conclusion 
that it was Mr. Wright or could have excluded him. Isn't 
that right? 
A That's right. 
Q All right. And there was no obstacle to having 
that done on your part, was there? 
A No. 
Q Now, Detective Olsen, you only showed Mr. Huff one 
picture. Isn't that right? 
A That's r ight . 
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Q And it was of Matthew Wright; isn't that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q So Mr. Huff was never given the opportunity, for 
instance, to look at a photo array that included six to eight 
to ten other African-American individuals to see if he 
actually knew which individual came into the store that 
night. Isn't that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q In other words, it appears that you took him at 
his word that he said he knew who this individual was, and 
therefore there was no need to investigate further. Correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q You'll agree with me, won't you, that showing just 
one picture to a witness has the effect of reinforcing their 
original identification. Isn't that correct? 
A It could. I was going on the grounds he knew the 
individual and he wasn't identifying him. He was merely 
saying that this is the individual that has the same name 
that we are after. In other words, I am sure there is more 
than one Matthew Wright in the valley. So I was having him 
confirm, Is this the Matthew Wright that you told me about? 
Q You are aware, are you not, that there are 
oftentimes legal challenges to what we call "show-ups" 
including only one picture. Isn't that correct? 
A That's correct. 
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Q So showing an individual a photograph that 
includes just one individual can be suggestive by it's very 
nature? 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, your Honor. Calls for a 
legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q You are aware that there have been challenges to 
such procedures in the past. Isn't that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, Mr. Olsen, did you think it odd at all that 
if Mr. Huff, in fact, knew the individual, Mr. Wright, and 
that Mr. Wright would have known Mr. Huff, that Mr. Wright, a 
black man, would walk into a store and present the check of 
his white roommate to somebody that he knew. Didn't that 
seem odd? 
A No. It doesn't seem odd to me because I have done 
a lot of other cases that are the same similarity. 
Q But you did nothing further to investigate the 
possibility of Mr. Huff's misidentification, did you? 
A No. 
MS. WELLS: That's all. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS. BYRNE: Yes. 
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